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In the Supreme Court of the United States 
_________ 
 
No. 12-398 
_________ 
 
ASSOCIATION FOR MOLECULAR PATHOLOGY, ET AL., 
  Petitioners, 
v. 
 
MYRIAD GENETICS, INC., ET AL., 
  Respondents. 
_________ 
 
BRIEF OF GENEDX AND LAW PROFESSORS 
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITIONERS 
_________ 
 
INTEREST STATEMENT OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici are GeneDx and law professors whose schol-
arship and teaching focuses on patent law and related 
fields.1  Amicus GeneDx is a diagnostic laboratory 
that was started for the purpose of providing molecu-
lar diagnoses for patients and families with rare and 
                                                 
1 Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.6, no counsel for a 
party authored this brief in whole or part, and no person 
or entity made any monetary contribution to the prepara-
tion or submission of the brief.  The petitioners in this case 
have filed a letter giving blanket consent to the filing of 
amicus briefs in this case.  The respondents have specifi-
cally consented to the filing of this amicus brief. 
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ultra-rare hereditary disorders. The company was 
formed by National Institutes of Health (NIH) scien-
tists who wished to provide diagnostic services to the 
families with histories of genetic disorders.  GeneDx 
has discovered several genes linked to rare skin 
disorders and has never attempted to patent such 
genes.  As long as the federal courts uphold patents 
on human genes linked to disorders that NIH scien-
tists or patients wish tested, GeneDx is unable to 
assist such families.  The small market for rare disor-
der testing services, combined with the large invest-
ment in time and effort to develop new tests, makes 
paying license fees to gene patent owners an absolute 
deterrent to developing diagnostics for patients 
suffering from most rare disorders.  Gene patents 
have accordingly had a negative impact on the devel-
opment and availability of genetic tests for patients 
and families, especially those with rare disorders. 
Amici law professors are Linda J. Demaine, Aaron 
X. Fellmeth, and Dennis Karjala, Professors of Law at 
the Arizona State University, Sandra Day O’Connor 
College of Law.  Law faculty have an interest in 
ensuring that the Patent Act is interpreted to reflect 
accurately the constitutional limits on Congress’s 
power to grant patents, the historical underpinnings 
of U.S. patent law, and the public policies the Consti-
tution and Patent Act seek to promote.   
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress no power to 
issue patents on products of nature, nor has Congress 
sought to exercise such a power.  The Supreme Court 
has accordingly held patents on natural phenomena 
invalid long and consistently.  Scientific and techno-
logical innovation has benefited from this policy. 
However, the policy has come under threat by the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and certain 
federal courts, which have granted and upheld pa-
tents on “isolated,” natural human genes as well as 
cDNA copies of them.  Such genes and cDNA are 
products of nature regardless of whether they have 
been “purified,” removed from larger molecules, or 
synthesized using well-known methods to copy the 
coding portions of natural human DNA. 
Judge Lourie’s opinion below treats natural human 
DNA as if it were an industrial chemical whose physi-
cal structure determines its properties.  He treated 
the human chromosome as the relevant molecule, so 
that any natural chemical contained in that chromo-
some is not a “product of nature,” in his opinion.    
This conclusion reflects a fundamental misconcon-
ception about DNA molecules.  Living DNA cannot be 
compared to inert industrial chemicals.  DNA mole-
cules and chromosomes may have identical physical 
structures while producing wildly different proteins 
and other biochemicals; it is the order of nucleotides 
that determines the gene’s biological function.  One 
who merely replicates the order of nucleotides by 
“isolating” a gene or part of a gene is claiming the 
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essence and raison d’être of the gene.  All protein-
coding genes exist to express proteins; by claiming the 
natural sequence of DNA coding for a natural protein, 
a patent applicant claims a portion of the blueprint of 
life itself. 
The Federal Circuit also relied on a lower court 
decision from 1911, holding that when a product of 
nature has been so altered to have greater therapeutic 
or commercial value, it becomes patentable subject 
matter.  Although lower courts have increasingly 
relied on this theory, it is the wrong standard for 
determining the patentability of products of nature.  
This Court has never held, and should not hold, that 
some human intervention that increases the inherent 
therapeutic or commercial value of a product of 
nature ipso facto justifies treating the result as a new 
and distinct product susceptible to patenting. 
Instead, the Court should continue to hold that a 
product of nature must be transformed into a new 
article with a markedly different name, character, and 
use to qualify as patentable subject matter.  As this 
“substantial transformation test” applies to human 
DNA, “isolated” genes fail to qualify as patentable 
subject matter.  The essence of a human gene is its 
ability to express a specific protein; therefore, any 
molecule that merely extracts or copies the gene’s 
sequence of nucleotides to express that same protein 
is insufficiently different from the natural gene.  If 
the new molecule performs the same biological func-
tion as the natural gene, it is the same product of 
nature. 
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By similar logic, a cDNA molecule that merely cop-
ies the protein-coding portions of a human gene 
(exons) is a gene with its regulatory nucleotide se-
quences omitted.  It performs precisely the same 
biological function as the natural and “isolated” 
genes, in the same way, and merely represents an 
attempt to patent the natural gene.  Moreover, the 
concept of omitting the non-coding region of a DNA 
molecule (introns) is not a human innovation, it is a 
well-known natural process.  Messenger RNA, a 
natural molecule used in the process of gene transla-
tion, is a single-stranded copy of the gene with the 
introns omitted.  A cDNA is “synthetic” only in the 
sense that it is a double-stranded version of the 
mRNA molecule, with the complementary strand 
dictated by the same laws of nature that dictate 
DNA’s complementary strand.  There is nothing 
remotely inventive about it. 
If products of nature are unpatentable subject mat-
ter, biologically insignficant modifications to products 
of nature should also be unpatentable.  The substan-
tial transformation test draws a reasonably bright 
line between insignificantly altered products of nature 
and man-made inventions; is consistent with Supreme 
Court precedent; and avoids the many negative 
repercussions of patents that confer an effective 
monopoly on fundamental biological components of 
the human body. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Products of nature are not patentable sub-
ject matter. 
The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to grant 
patents only to “Inventors” for their “Discoveries.” 
U.S. CONST. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 8.  The term “discover-
ies,” as used in this clause, is a term of art.  It refers 
not to preexisting facts that any person might come 
upon, but rather as a synonym for “inventions,” being 
the product of human ingenuity.  See Linda Demaine 
& Aaron Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double-Helix, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 303, 367-74 (2002).  The Constitution 
thereby establishes that a newly discovered product of 
nature is not patentable subject matter, because it 
was not “invented” by any person. 
Consistent with this limitation on congressional 
power, Congress drafted the 1952 Patent Act to 
authorize a patent on any “new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof.”  35 U.S.C. 
§ 101.  Newly perceived products of nature are by 
definition not “new,” but preexist the human percep-
tion of them.  Although Congress has several times 
considered amendments to the Patent Act that touch 
on the question of whether products of nature are 
patentable, such as the Plant Patent Act of 1930, 46 
Stat. 703, ch. 497, codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 161-64, it has never endorsed the patenting of 
natural phenomena of any kind. 
This Court has accordingly long held that patents 
may not be granted on products of nature.  E.g., 
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Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 313 
(1980).  Never has the Court strayed from this firm 
rule.  “[T]o transform an unpatentable law of nature 
into a patent-eligible application of such a law, one 
must do more than simply state the law of nature 
while adding the words ‘apply it.’”  Mayo Collabora-
tive Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 
S.Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).   
That the discovery of a product of nature may have 
been difficult, costly, uncertain, and scientifically 
groundbreaking is and has always been irrelevant.  
“Products of nature are nonstatutory subject matter. 
This defect cannot be remedied by a showing of 
novelty, utility, or non-obviousness.” John M. Conley 
& Robert Makowski, Back to the Future: Rethinking 
the Product of Nature Doctrine as a Barrier to Bio-
technology Patents (Part II), 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 371, 391 (2003).  In any case, genes are not 
difficult, costly, or uncertain to discover.  Using 
modern sequencing technology, the entire human 
genome can now be sequenced with certainty within a 
week at the cost of a few thousand dollars. 
This conclusion is consistent with the policies the 
Framers sought to promote in the Constitution’s 
Intellectual Property Clause.  Products of nature, 
thought as yet undiscovered, exist in the public 
domain; they are res communis, “free to all men and 
reserved exclusively to none.”  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 
at 309.  They are elemental components of the physi-
ology of living organisms, a functioning ecology, or 
the chemistry of the universe.  The innate curiosity of 
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homo scientificus and the structure of universities, 
which reward faculty and students finding new facts 
about nature, together provide sufficient incentive to 
research natural phenomena.  No patent incentive is 
generally required for such fundamental discoveries.  
Moreover, because products of nature are the funda-
mental building blocks of all matter and life, a patent 
on a product of nature risks investing the patentee 
with a power to tax or entirely prevent research on 
vast and uncharted fields of knowledge.  Such a power 
may generally be expected to extend far out of propor-
tion to the effort and insight invested in discovering 
the product of nature. 
 
II. Human genes, including isolated human 
DNA sequences, are products of nature un-
less transformed into a new product with a 
different biological function. 
That an “isolated” human gene remains a product 
of nature is evident from the fact that the person 
claiming such a gene “invented” nothing.  He merely 
used well-known techniques for severing a string of 
nucleic acids from their surrounding chromosomal 
matrix.  In fact, it is perfectly possible to obtain a 
patent without even having performed the act of 
severing the gene from the chromosome; success in 
“isolating” the gene is so certain using standard 
laboratory techniques that a patent applicant need 
merely sequence the gene (as discussed below, also 
using well known and mostly automated techniques 
invented by others) and submit the patent application 
claiming the “isolated” gene as an “invention.”  Yet, 
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there is no invention in isolating a gene, and without 
invention, Congress has no power to grant a patent 
under the Constitution. 
Nonetheless, some 30 years ago, the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) began granting patents on 
human genes in their natural state, with the word 
“isolated” affixed to the claim.  Judge Lourie of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit believes 
that isolated human DNA is patentable subject mat-
ter, because is it not “found in nature” as such.  
Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States 
Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1325 
(Fed. Cir. 2012).  His and Judge Moore’s opinions 
seem to recognize that, to constitute patentable 
subject matter, an invention must be “man-made,” 
“the product of human ingenuity,” “markedly differ-
ent” from what exists in nature, and have a “distinc-
tive name, character, and use.”  Id. at 1325-26, 1329 
(Lourie, J.), 1339 (Moore, J.). 
These opinions also admit that an “isolated” human 
protein-coding gene contains the same biological 
information (that is, it codes for the same protein) as 
the natural gene existing in the human body.  Like 
that natural gene, the isolated DNA sequence serves 
the sole biological function of expressing a specific 
protein.  However, Judge Lourie believes that isolated 
genes qualify as patentable subject matter because 
they have a “distinctive chemical structure.”  Id. at 
1328.  By this, he means that a “chemical” is defined 
as a group of atoms covalently bonded to one another; 
by severing some of those bonds, a person creates a 
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different “chemical.”  Because in nature a DNA 
molecule is “intertwined with various proteins,” 
under this view, a chromosome is a single “molecule.”  
Id.  Based on this belief, Judge Lourie reasoned that 
“isolated” natural DNA satisfies this Court’s prece-
dents distinguishing products of nature from patent-
able inventions, because the isolated DNA has been 
cleaved from the chromosome by human intervention.  
Id. at 1328, 1330; see also id. at 1341-42 (Moore, J., 
concurring).  Judge Moore further concluded that this 
chemical manipulation satisfies the criteria for a 1911 
lower court decision, Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. 
Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), , aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912), presum-
ably because the isolated gene has commercial uses to 
which the natural gene cannot be put while remain-
ing in the chromosome. 
These opinions make much of the “human interven-
tion” involved in isolating DNA from the chromo-
some, calling the resulting product “man-made” 
repeatedly throughout.  However, neither opinion 
argues that human intervention alters the biological 
use of the DNA in the claims at issue.  The opinions 
try to minimize the significance of DNA’s biological 
function, calling it “irrelevant,” and preferring to 
focus on the differences between the chemical struc-
ture of the assumed product of nature (a chromo-
some) and the chemical structure of the much small-
er, isolated (or “purified”) gene.  See Association for 
Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1330 (Lourie, J.), 
1343 (Moore, J.). 
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These opinions are correct in asserting that an iso-
lated gene is a product of human intervention, in 
much the same way that (as Judge Bryson put it) a 
kidney is the product of human intervention when 
excised from a human body.  Id. at 1352-53 (Bryson, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  But the 
input of skill and labor no more takes kidneys out of 
the realm of products of nature when “isolated” than 
does the DNA sequence of nucleotides.  The fact that 
removing the nucleotides is performed by a geneticist 
or biochemist “in the laboratory,” id. at 1325, is no 
more significant than the fact that the isolation of the 
kidney is performed by a surgeon in an operating 
room.2  Nor does the “skill, knowledge, and effort” 
required to isolate the DNA matter, id. at 1332, if the 
result is a product of nature (although the process of 
isolating it may well be patentable subject matter).  In 
any case, as noted, sequencing and isolating a human 
                                                 
2 One especially egregious error Judge Lourie made in 
rejecting this comparison was to suggest that removing a 
human kidney requires little skill, knowledge, or effort.  
Id. at 1332.  He is greatly underestimating both the 
difficulties of surgery and the ease of sequencing and 
isolating DNA.  It is especially ironic that he tried to 
buttress his argument that courts should let sleeping dogs 
lie by noting that the PTO issued 2,645 patents claiming 
isolated DNA over the past twenty-nine years.  The num-
ber leaps to 40,000 if DNA-related patents of human genes 
are included, according to his opinion.  If DNA requires 
such exceptional knowledge, skill, and effort to sequence 
and isolate, it is strange that there should be such a 
massive proliferation of DNA patents. 
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gene has long been well within the skill of any ordi-
nary biochemist. 
The argument that removing DNA from a chromo-
some is distinguishable because it converts the DNA 
to a “different molecular entity” misses the point.  
The gene is not merely an inert “chemical entity” like 
sodium chloride or ammonia, it is a biological compo-
nent, an integral, defining, and biologically functional 
part of human life.  Its physical structure does not 
define it; different chromosomes and genes can have 
the identical macrostructures while having radically 
differing functions.  A gene is defined by its sequence 
of nucleotides.  It is composed of an arrangement of 
nucleotides that, in the specific order they exist in 
nature, expresses a specific protein or RNA product.  
A change to that order is likely to change the protein.  
Expressing a specific protein is the very reason for the 
protein-coding gene’s existence.  To claim the se-
quence of nucleotides coding for the protein is to 
claim the natural gene and its biological function.  It 
is to claim a portion of life’s blueprint. 
Judge Moore’s attempt to distinguish a patent on a 
natural product like a human kidney from a patent on 
an isolated gene fails as well.  The Parke-Davis case 
does not set forth the correct standard for invention.  
Parke-Davis relied on the fact that the patent appli-
cant had done something to confer greater therapeu-
tic and commercial value on the product of nature as 
the basis for accepting the resulting “purified” chemi-
cal as a new, synthetic product.  But increasing a 
natural product’s therapeutic or commercial value 
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does not automatically make the resulting product 
patentable subject matter.  The excised kidney, like 
the isolated gene, is “for every practical purpose a 
new thing commercially and therapeutically,” Parke-
Davis, 189 F. at 103, quoted in Association for Molecu-
lar Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1339.  A kidney removed 
from a human body can be used as a life-saving trans-
plant; one currently in a body cannot.  The attempt to 
distinguish the cases is strained and unconvincing. 
This Court has long and consistently denied the 
patentability of natural phenomena that have been 
insignificantly altered.  See Mayo Collaborative Ser-
vices v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 
(2012) (correlation between the presence of drug in 
the bloodstream and the biologically effective dosage 
of the drug); American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex 
Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1931) (natural fruit treated 
with mold-resisting chemical); cf. Winans v. Denmead, 
56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 341 (1853) (“Under our law a 
patent cannot be granted merely for a change of 
form.... Merely to change the form... is the work of a 
constructor, not of an inventor; such a change cannot 
be deemed an invention.”).  A policy of awarding 
patents for minor alterations of a product of nature 
improves in no way on a policy of allowing patents on 
products of nature.  A patent applicant may be ex-
pected to make trivial alterations to natural products 
in order to bring them within the scope of patentable 
subject matter or adapt them to commercial needs.  
De minimis non curat lex “is part of the established 
background of legal principles against which all 
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enactments are adopted, and which all enactments 
(absent contrary indication) are deemed to accept.”  
Wisconsin Department of Revenue v. William Wrigley, 
Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 231 (1992). 
A certain line of district and appellate court cases, 
illustrated by Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in 
Parke-Davis and on which Judge Moore especially 
relied, has contradicted this Court’s doctrine denying 
the patentability of minor variants of products of 
nature.  See generally Demaine & Fellmeth, supra, at 
334-39 (describing the line of cases).  In Parke-Davis, 
the district court held that a new process for purifying 
the human hormone adrenaline could justify a prod-
uct patent on the resulting relatively pure adrenaline, 
because the purer adrenaline was therapeutically and 
commercially more valuable than less pure adrena-
line.  189 F. at 102-03.  Parke-Davis conflated the 
invention of a process with the invention of its result-
ing product in weighing the ingenuity of the purifica-
tion process in favor of the the ingenuity of the result-
ing product.  It also conflated the utility of an innova-
tion with its patentability.  The relevant question is 
not whether some modicum of human intervention 
has conferred greater therapeutic or commercial value 
on a product of nature.  As noted above, a kidney does 
not become commercially or therapeutically valuable 
until removed from the human body, but its removal 
does not render it patentable subject matter.  The 
pertinent question is whether it has transformed the 
product of nature into a new and markedly different 
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product with a distinctive name, character, and use.3  
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980). 
This Court has never held, and should not now hold, 
that a new-found product of nature becomes patenta-
ble merely because a human act has given it more 
practical or commercial utility, or even a different 
overall chemical structure.  On the contrary, in Funk 
Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 
(1948), this Court decisively rejected the argument 
that minor alterations to a product of nature rendered 
it patentable.  In that case, the patentee had packaged 
together several strains of naturally occurring plant-
inoculating bacteria.  The patent was based on the 
discovery that, although many strains of inoculating 
bacteria inhibit each other from assisting plants in 
fixing nitrogen for growth and metabolism when 
combined, certain strains had no inhibitory effect on 
other strains and could usefully be packaged together 
as an inoculant for multiple crops.  The applicant 
accordingly claimed a combination of natural bacteria.  
The Court held that, because the bacteria continued 
to perform their natural function in the way they 
always had, the patent applicant had not invented a 
patentable product. 
                                                 
3 In Chakrabarty, this Court used the classic customs law 
formulation “name, character, and use,” but, as discussed 
in Demaine & Fellmeth, supra, at 394-95, a change in 
name serves at most as an indirect and unreliable indicator 
of change in character and use. 
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The Funk Brothers decision was based on the 
recognition that allowing patents on insubstantial 
modifications of products of nature does not serve the 
patent law’s goal of encouraging innovation.  Alt-
hough it is reasonable to take issue with the applica-
tion of that principle on the facts before the Court at 
that time, the fundamental premise is sound.  Funk 
Brothers followed a long line of cases rejecting the 
patentability of both products of nature and insub-
stantial variations on previously known substances.  
If Parke-Davis was not very widely followed by other 
courts before the Funk Brothers decision, it certainly 
was not followed afterward.  See generally Demaine & 
Fellmeth, supra, at 334-45 (recounting the history of 
case law dealing with patents on purified products of 
nature). 
However, with the adoption of the 1952 Patent Act, 
the tide soon turned, and the Parke-Davis reasoning 
began to dominate federal jurisprudence.  Appellate 
courts began approving patents on purified products 
of nature, justifying the patent by the technical 
differences between the product of nature and in-
creased therapeutic or commercial value of the puri-
fied substance.  See generally Demaine & Fellmeth, 
supra, at 349-60.  It is not entirely clear why lower 
courts began departing from this Court’s precedents 
after the adoption of the Act.  One possible reason, 
supported by the fact that most such decisions related 
to pharmaceutical and biochemical patents, is that 
courts considered improvements in the field of health 
and medicine more urgent than in other fields having 
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less direct and immediate effect on human welfare.  
They may have believed that a looser patent policy 
would be helpful to foster medical advances and 
reinterpreted the law accordingly. 
Another possibility is that courts read the language 
of the new Patent Act as signalling a congressional 
desire to abandon or minimize the prohibition on 
patenting products of nature, because the Act includ-
ed no such prohibition expressis verbis.  On this 
theory, Section 103 of the Act forbade patents on 
variants of prior art (defined in Section 102 of the 
Act, 35 U.S.C. § 102) that would have been obvious at 
the time of invention.  See 35 U.S.C. § 103.  But 
Section 102 of the Act does not include undiscovered 
products of nature in its catalog of prior art.  Ergo, 
the courts may have reasoned, obvious variants on 
undiscovered products of nature may be patented 
under the Patent Act.  In short, “the Act seems to 
sanction by omission the patenting of obvious deriva-
tives of naturally occurring phenomena.”  Demaine & 
Fellmeth, supra, at 383.  If this hypothesis is correct, 
then these courts must have been unaware of, or 
must have ignored that, undiscovered products of 
nature do in fact qualify as prior art under the Patent 
Act.  All human DNA is already in public use in this 
country, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), by all persons whose body 
use that DNA biologically.  Moreover, the courts 
improperly interpreted the codification of the scat-
tered patent statutes as repudiating Supreme Court 
and CCPA precedents prohibiting patents on insignif-
icantly altered products of nature. 
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Whatever the reason for this departure from this 
Court’s precedents, the Parke-Davis reasoning gained 
ascendancy when the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals endorsed it in In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394 
(C.C.P.A. 1970).  There, the CCPA rejected the “con-
sistent principle . . . that a claim to a purified material 
cannot be allowed unless the purified material exhib-
its properties and utilities not possessed by the unpu-
rified material.”  Id. at 1398.  Instead, the court relied 
on the tautology that, if the applicant sought a patent 
on a product of nature purer than its natural form, 
the applicant was not seeking to patent a product of 
nature in the first place.  Id. at 1401-02.  The Federal 
Circuit endorsed this line of reasoning in Amgen, Inc. 
v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206-07 
(Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Genetics Insti-
tute v. Amgen, Inc., 502 U.S. 856 (1991), and this new 
doctrine has represented federal jurisprudence ever 
since, though never endorsed by this Court. 
The Federal Circuit’s decision below follows and 
ratifies the Parke-Davis and Amgen v. Chugai line 
cases, mistaking the mere fact of human intervention 
using some knowledge, skill, or effort for the func-
tionally inconsequential removal of natural DNA from 
its surroundings, as a basis for denying the status of a 
human gene as a product of nature.  These are not, 
have never been, and should not be, the proper crite-
ria for determining whether a product of nature has 
been transformed into patentable subject matter 
under this Court’s jurisprudence. 
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Nonetheless, because of the Federal Circuit’s cur-
rent policy, the effective rule in practice is currently 
that a product of nature constitutes patentable sub-
ject matter as long as it has been somehow altered, no 
matter how trivially, by human intervention, giving it 
a superior practical use—typically a therapeutic, 
diagnostic, or research use—it did not have in its 
natural, unaltered state.  This has allowed many 
patent applicants to successfully claim products of 
nature by merely qualifying the claims with the 
talismanic words “isolated,” “purified,” or “synthe-
sized.”  See Demaine & Fellmeth, supra, at 358-59; 
Conley & Makowski, supra, at 394.  Patent lawyers in 
the past three decades have openly used this formula 
to monopolize any commercial use of human genes.  
For example, one patent prosecutor advised fellow 
practitioners: “The discovery of a product in nature, 
although not an invention, may well lead to an inven-
tion by the proper use of claim language.”  Karl Bozi-
cevic, Distinguishing “Products of Nature” from 
Products Derived from Nature, 69 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 415, 426 (1987) (emphasis 
added).  Notice that he said not “by inventive activi-
ty,” but by the phrasing of the patent application.  
While patent prosecutors may celebrate the triumph 
of semantics over substance, it is bad law and bad 
policy.  “Because the distinction between a statutory 
invention and a nonstatutory product of nature is one 
of substance rather than form, cases should not be 
resolved on the basis of incantations. . . . The case law 
simply does not support the existence of linguistic 
safe harbors.”  Conley & Makowski, supra, at 392. 
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The reasoning of these decisions leads to potential-
ly absurd results by reductio ad absurdum: 
If any naturally occurring substance that can-
not be found in purified form in nature were 
patentable the first time it was isolated and pu-
rified, then the first person to purify water 
could have patented it; the first person to 
strain blood cells out of blood could have pa-
tented pure plasma because plasma always con-
tains blood cells in its natural state; and for 
that matter, the first person to climb up a ba-
nana tree, pull down a fruit, and peel it would 
have merited a patent on “isolated and puri-
fied” banana fruit, because in nature bananas 
always grow on trees and with peels. 
Demaine & Fellmeth, supra, at 391. 
As this Court recognized in Mayo Collaborative 
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, 132 S.Ct. 1289, 
1293 (2012), ultimately, all inventions are traceable 
back to products of nature and natural phenomena, 
which supply the particles, atoms and laws that make 
up all matter in the universe and allow it to interact.  
This Court has not had occasion to formulate a pre-
cise test for distinguishing products of nature from 
patentable inventions based on them, but it has 
clearly indicated factors that should be considered in 
the analysis. 
Specifically, this Court rejected a patent on a natu-
ral citrus fruit treated with borax to resist mold on 
the ground that the resulting fruit had no “new or 
distinctive form, quality, or property. . . . There is no 
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change in the name, appearance, or general character 
of the fruit.”  American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brog-
dex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1931).  In Funk Brothers v. 
Kalo Inoculant, part of the Court’s rationale for 
invalidating the patent was that the claimed combina-
tion of bacteria did not alter the utility of any one of 
the bacteria species: “No species acquires a different 
use.”  333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).  The Court’s opinion 
upholding the patent on a recombinant bacterium in 
Chakrabarty, relied heavily on the fact that the bacte-
rium was “markedly different” from any naturally 
occurring bacterium, and had “a distinctive name, 
character [and] use.”  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-
10. 
From these and other cases, Demaine and Fellmeth 
determined that the Court has been using a “substan-
tial transformation test” similar to the one tradition-
ally used in customs law for determining the country 
of origin of a good from one country subjected to 
processing steps in another.  Under this test, a preex-
isting product or combination of products traditional-
ly becomes a new and different article if subjected to 
processing steps that cause the precursors to lose 
their identities and become “a new article having a 
new name, character, and use.”  United States v. 
Gibson-Thomsen, 27 C.C.P.A. 267, 273 (1940). 
Demaine and Fellmeth articulated and justified this 
test as consistent with this Court’s precedent in 
determining whether a product of nature had been 
sufficiently altered to qualify as an invention.  
Demaine & Fellmeth, supra, at 393-407.  As noted, 
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the Federal Circuit seems to have accepted that this 
test is the appropriate one, but it misapplied the test 
on the facts before it.  The character of a human 
protein-coding gene is a double-helical molecule 
composed of nucleotides arranged for the production 
of a specific protein.  The biological “use” of a protein-
coding gene is the production of a specific protein.  
The character and use of the gene in its natural state 
and in “isolated” DNA is precisely the same.  It is not 
even marginally different; much less is it “markedly 
different.” 
The Court should uphold its previous decisions re-
quiring a substantial transformation of a product of 
nature to qualify it as patentable subject matter.  As 
Demaine and Fellmeth argued, in the context of a 
protein-coding gene, a substantial transformation 
does not occur unless the gene has been so altered as 
to acquire a new and different biological function, 
which means producing something other than the 
protein for which the natural gene codes.  See id.  No 
other alteration to a natural biochemical is sufficient 
to avoid conferring a monopoly on all meaningful uses 
of the product of nature.  See id. 
The substantial transformation test articulated by 
this Court, as interpreted by Demaine and Fellmeth, 
fulfills the policy purposes of the patent law.  It is 
clear in application, because only changes to a gene 
sequence that result in a new, synthetic protein would 
qualify as patentable subject matter.  In other words, 
it draws a bright line between merely applying an 
idea taken from nature to a practical context (i.e., 
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discovering a law of nature and “applying it”) and 
creating something meaningfully different and man-
made, an “invention.”  It is consistent with this 
Court’s precedents, discussed above, because any 
change to the gene’s biological function necessarily 
and markedly changes the gene’s character and use.  
In contrast, an alteration that does not change the 
gene’s biological function but merely uses it in a 
different context or adjusts the rate of expression 
would not qualify, because no invention has occurred 
with respect to that gene.4  As Demaine and Fellmeth 
concluded: 
Transformation of biological function is not 
the same as change of context.  For example, if 
a natural protein is discovered to promote cell 
growth in nature, the fact that the protein is 
only useful for therapeutic purposes after be-
ing purified, concentrated, or otherwise modi-
fied does not by itself render the modified pro-
tein “new.”  This is merely a change of con-
text, not a transformation of biological func-
tion.  If the protein’s function is the same in 
the therapeutic context (e.g., promoting cell 
                                                 
4 For example, isolating the gene from the chromosome 
and using in an assay, or transfecting a vector with a clone 
of a natural gene to create a cell line would not qualify as a 
substantial transformation.  The artificial cell line itself or 
the process of creating it could, however, qualify as patent-
able subject matter, because the biological function of the 
cells will have been altered by causing them to produce 
unnatural proteins. 
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growth) as its function in nature, then no 
change of utility has occurred, and merely ad-
justing the form of the substance cannot work 
a substantial transformation on it.  The same 
analysis applies to DNA molecules.  If a natu-
rally occurring DNA molecule has the useful 
function of coding for Protein X, then no puri-
fied or otherwise altered version of that DNA 
molecule can be “new” unless its claimed func-
tion is fundamentally different than coding for 
Protein X.  Without a change in biological 
function, the DNA molecule lacks adequate 
creative input to qualify as an invention; it is 
little more than a molecule found in nature 
with superficial modifications. 
Demaine & Fellmeth, supra, at 400. 
The test also fits well with other key patent doc-
trines, such as the prohibition on patenting obvious 
innovations, 35 U.S.C. § 103, and the Doctrine of 
Equivalents.  Section 103 of the Patent Act is the 
statutory codification of key federal jurisprudence 
defining “invention.”  As noted, merely extracting or 
reproducing a portion of a natural DNA molecule is 
not an invention, and the act of isolating human 
genes and cloning them is always obvious based on 
prior art.  The Doctrine of Equivalents, as articulated 
by this Court, allows a patent owner to seek protec-
tion against nonliteral infringement of the claims 
when the accused product performs substantially the 
same function in substantially the same way to 
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achieve the same result.  Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. 
Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).   
A man-made gene that does not perform the same 
biological function as a natural gene would pass these 
tests and qualify as nonobvious and nonequivalent.  If 
a product of nature is not patentable subject matter, 
neither should be an obvious modification of the 
natural product.  The substantial transformation test 
achieves this outcome without discouraging meaning-
ful technological advances.  See generally Demaine & 
Fellmeth, supra, at 406 (discussing the advantages of 
the test). 
Finally, because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal already interprets the substantial transfor-
mation test in the customs law context, the test will 
already be familiar to it. 
When the law is uncertain, courts should consider 
whether the policy consequences of one interpretation 
or another serves the legislative purpose.  As noted, 
the Constitution does not authorize Congress to grant 
patents to encourage all knowledge of any kind what-
soever, but only to encourage “Discoveries.”  U.S. 
CONST. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8.  The Patent Act, too, 
authorizes patents only for those who “invent” a new 
and useful product.  35 U.S.C. § 101.  Judge Lourie 
claimed that his interpretation of the Patent Act 
serves the patent law’s policy purposes by encourag-
ing innovation, Association for Molecular Pathology, 
689 F.3d at 1331, while in the same breath insisting 
that “it is ultimately for Congress” to weigh the policy 
consequences of overturning the case law holding 
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human DNA patentable, id. at 1330-31.  This is a 
rather disingenuous self-contradiction.  In any case, 
Congress has never blessed the patenting of human 
genes; it was lower courts themselves that engaged in 
their own act of invention to create a policy of allow-
ing patents on human genes, in defiance of this 
Court’s precedents disapproving of patents on very 
similar purified products of nature.  To claim that it is 
Congress, not the courts, that should reverse lower 
court decisions usurping Supreme Court precedents is 
absurd.  Despite considerable industry lobbying in 
favor of allowing gene patents and public sentiment 
opposed to such patents, Congress has chosen not to 
legislate on the subject.  It clearly prefers to leave this 
issue to the courts. 
Using the substantial transformation test, as advo-
cated here, serves the purposes of patent law.  It 
encourages technological innovation beyond mere 
copying of human genes without imposing excessive 
tollbooth costs on biotechnology research.  It avoids at 
least three negative repercussions that would serious-
ly undermine the public policies promoted by the 
Patent Act. 
First, allowing patents on isolated human genes 
over-rewards the least difficult, costly, and inventive 
stage of the development process of pharmaceuticals, 
assays, and other downstream therapeutic inventions.  
An efficient patent system would grant patents con-
ferring a scope of protection no greater than what was 
invented—an observation made by Jeremy Bentham 
two hundred years ago.  2 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE 
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RATIONALE OF REWARD ch. IX (1825). By awarding 
patents conferring a legal monopoly on exceedingly 
broad and largely unknown downstream medical 
research uses of the gene, gene patents awards a 
windfall on upstream researchers of basic biology 
while creating barriers to the more difficult and 
exacting research closer to therapeutic end-uses. 
Second, unlike the great majority of inventions, it is 
exceedingly difficult to “invent around” human genes 
for, by way of example, ascertaining a patient’s sus-
ceptibility to gene-linked disorders or creating biolog-
ically necessary human proteins.  Isolating natural 
genes or reproducing them, or their coding regions, is 
the only efficient and predictable method of making 
natural genes scientifically and commercially availa-
ble on a large scale.  Demaine & Fellmeth, supra, at 
418.   Allowing patents on isolated human genes gives 
the first person to sequence the gene an effective 
exclusionary right not just to that gene itself, but to 
the protein it produces and all uses of the gene in any 
later medical invention, including cell lines for the 
production of the protein, assays to detect the pres-
ence of the gene in medical patients, and any other 
use later discovered.5  
                                                 
5 Patents on “isolated and purified” natural human pro-
teins have also been sanctioned by the Federal Circuit, and 
are even more problematic than the patenting of human 
genes.  It is at least theoretically possible to produce 
pharmaceutically viable human proteins through methods 
other than recombinant technology, such as pure chemical 
protein synthesis.  A patent on a human protein by the 
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Third, because of the difficulty of inventing around 
basic building blocks of nature and the fact that 
multiple genes may be involved in any given medical 
condition, there is a risk of creating an “anticom-
mons” by which the owner of any one human gene 
patent can hold up or block the development of im-
portant medical diagnostics and therapies, and in any 
case would raise the costs of basic medical research 
through higher license search costs and stacking of 
license fees on top of each other.  Monopolization of 
products of nature “through the grant of a patent 
might tend to impede innovation more than it would 
tend to promote it.” Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1293 
(2012); see Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998).  Far from 
promoting the progress of scientific innovation, such 
patents tend to retard progress, as the empirical 
                                                 
first person to express it through a vector transfected with 
the cDNA clone of a human gene monopolizes a constitu-
ent element of the human body even though someone else 
may be able to develop an entirely different and nonobvi-
ous method for synthesizing that protein chemically.  See 
Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, The Challenge to Patent Law of 
Pure Chemical Protein Synthesis, 23 NATURE BIOTECH. 
547 (2005).  By adopting the substantial transformation 
test proposed here with regard to all natural biochemicals, 
this Court reaffirm the invalidity of such “gold rush” 
tactics that attempt to monopolize products of nature 
found but not invented by the patent applicant. 
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evidence suggests it has already done.  See Julia 
Carbone et al., DNA Patents and Diagnostics: Not a 
Pretty Picture, 28 NATURE BIOTECH. 784 (2010); 
Michelle R. Henry et al., DNA Patenting and Licens-
ing, 297 SCI. 1279 (2002); Mildred K. Cho et al., 
Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of 
Clinical Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR 
DIAGNOSTICS 3 (2003); Robert Cook-Deegan & Chis-
tropher Heaney, Patents in Genomics and Human 
Genetics, 11 ANN. REV. OF GENOMICS & HUM. 
GENETICS 383 (2010); Kurt Eichenwald, Push for 
Royalties Threatens Use of Down Syndrome Test, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 23, 1997, at A1. 
In short, patents on “isolated and purified” human 
genes are not just bad law, they are bad public policy.  
The Court should reaffirm its long-held jurisprudence 
denying the patentability of insignificantly altered 
products of nature.  It should specifically approve a 
substantial transformation test to weed out patents 
on biologically identical derivatives of human genes 
and other natural biochemicals. 
 
III. cDNA sequences copying human DNA are 
products of nature unless substantially 
transformed into a new product with a dif-
ferent biological function. 
Some of the claims in this case, such as claim 2, 
involve complementary DNA (cDNA) rather than 
“isolated” human DNA.  cDNA corresponds to the 
portion of the natural DNA sequence that codes for a 
protein (exons).  By omitting the non-coding regions 
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of the gene (introns, typically comprising up to 30% of 
the sequence), scientists may create a cDNA molecule 
that they can later transfect into a vector (i.e., a host 
cell) for regulated expression of the protein, which 
can be used as a living protein factory for the produc-
tion of pharmaceuticals or for the screening of drug 
candidates that are intended to act on the protein to 
resolve a disorder. 
This Court should treat a cDNA molecule having 
the same nucleotide sequence as the coding region of 
a natural gene no differently from that gene itself.   If 
a human gene is product of nature, so too is its coding 
region, and by extension a copy through cDNA or 
otherwise of the gene’s coding region.  The coding 
region is as much a product of nature as the DNA 
molecule as a whole.  It is, indeed, its essence.  
“[D]espite its nominal chemical distinctiveness, 
[cDNA derived from a human gene] is functionally 
indistinguishable from natural DNA and RNA.  It 
contains exactly the same genetic information as its 
natural counterpart.  It can do precisely the same 
work as a naturally occurring gene—protein synthe-
sis—and it employs precisely the same processes to do 
it, whether in the body or in the laboratory.”  Conley 
and Makowski, supra, at 394.  A cDNA copy of a 
human gene has precisely the same function—to 
express a specific protein—that the gene has in its 
natural state.  “The geneticist who discovers that a 
particular sequence produces a particular protein and 
isolates that sequence no more creates the protein-
producing nature of the sequence than the Funk 
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Brothers Seed patentee created the noninhibitory 
nature of the Rhizobium bacteria.”  Demaine & 
Fellmeth, supra, at 409. 
The U.S. government argued below that cDNA cop-
ies of human DNA are patentable subject matter if 
they pass a “magic microscope test,” meaning that 
nowhere in the human body can a cDNA sequence be 
found as such.  Association for Molecular Pathology, 
689 F.3d at 1326.  In effect, the government proposed 
a new test, under which a DNA molecule copied 
literally from the chromosome is a product of nature, 
while a molecule such as cDNA, which copies the most 
important part of the natural DNA molecule, is 
patentable subject matter, because the cDNA mole-
cule is not found in nature in that precise form.   
The government’s attempt to distinguish a product 
merely extracted from nature (an “isolated” natural 
gene) from a product extracted from an extract of 
nature (the exon sequence of a natural gene) is a 
distinction without a difference.  cDNA may be one 
step removed from the natural gene (its introns are 
not copied), but it is a simple step to accomplish and 
is equivalent for all biological purposes.  As Judge 
Lourie correctly observed below, isolated genes are 
also not found as such in nature.  This Court should 
reject the government’s proposed distinction between 
products of nature and inventions.  Exact identity to 
the product of nature is not the appropriate test for 
determining patentable subject matter.  The Court 
should not sanction the patenting of any biologically 
insignificant alteration of a human gene without 
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more, regardless of how much of the natural DNA 
sequence is omitted.  A person claiming the cDNA 
sequence of a natural gene no more created that 
sequence than he created the gene itself. 
Moreover, the argument that cDNA differs substan-
tially from the natural gene ignores the role of mes-
senger ribonucleic acid (mRNA) in gene expression.  
mRNA is a natural molecule that conveys information 
from the DNA to the ribosome during natural trans-
lation of coding DNA into proteins.  Like a cDNA 
molecule, the mRNA molecule contains only the 
coding region of the gene.  “The notion of removing 
introns, regions of a DNA sequence that do not code 
for proteins, is not a human invention.  In fact, during 
the process of natural DNA transcription, an mRNA 
molecule is created as a copy of a gene in preparation 
for protein synthesis.  During the creation of the 
mRNA, only the exons are reproduced.”  Demaine & 
Fellmeth, supra, at 408.  The only significant differ-
ence between an mRNA molecule and its correlative 
cDNA molecule is that the former is single-stranded 
and the latter is double-stranded.6  Scientists who 
create cDNA merely use well-known techniques for 
converting a natural mRNA molecule into cDNA.  
Indeed, even this process happens naturally; cells 
create processed pseudogenes in just this way.  In 
fact, an important function of cDNA in biotechnology 
                                                 
6 RNA also has a ribose sugar instead of deoxyribose 
sugar in its backbone and substitutes uracil for thymine in 
its base composition.  These differences do not affect the 
amino acid sequence conveyed by the sequence of bases. 
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is to reproduce the natural mRNA so that it can be 
translated into the natural protein.  The cDNA is a 
mere replica of natural mRNA and pseudogenes. 
This Court should apply the substantial transfor-
mation test to find that cDNA versions of naturally 
occurring human genes, if they merely “isolate and 
purify” those genes by copying the non-coding re-
gions, do not constitute patentable subject matter.  As 
with merely “isolated” genes, the biological function 
of the cDNA is identical to that of the natural gene—
the expression of a specific protein.  Only if the cDNA 
is altered to perform protein expression in a “marked-
ly different” way than the nature gene—generally by 
expressing an unnatural protein—should the cDNA 
be considered patentable subject matter. 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment below 
should be reversed. 
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